 | 2009 |
|---|
| 88 |       | Michael Backes,
Peng Ning:
Computer Security - ESORICS 2009, 14th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Saint-Malo, France, September 21-23, 2009. Proceedings
Springer 2009 |
| 87 | | Michael Backes,
Dennis Hofheinz,
Dominique Unruh:
CoSP: a general framework for computational soundness proofs.
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2009: 66-78 |
| 86 | | Michael Backes,
Martin P. Grochulla,
Catalin Hritcu,
Matteo Maffei:
Achieving Security Despite Compromise Using Zero-knowledge.
CSF 2009: 308-323 |
| 85 | | Michael Backes,
Boris Köpf,
Andrey Rybalchenko:
Automatic Discovery and Quantification of Information Leaks.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2009: 141-153 |
| 84 | | Michael Backes,
Tongbo Chen,
Markus Dürmuth,
Hendrik P. A. Lensch,
Martin Welk:
Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reflections Revisited.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2009: 315-327 |
| 83 | | Michael Backes,
Peter Druschel,
Andreas Haeberlen,
Dominique Unruh:
CSAR: A Practical and Provable Technique to Make Randomized Systems Accountable.
NDSS 2009 |
| 82 | | Michael Backes,
Marek Hamerlik,
Alessandro Linari,
Matteo Maffei,
Christos Tryfonopoulos,
Gerhard Weikum:
Anonymity and Censorship Resistance in Unstructured Overlay Networks.
OTM Conferences (1) 2009: 147-164 |
| 2008 |
|---|
| 81 | | Michael Backes,
Catalin Hritcu,
Matteo Maffei:
Type-checking zero-knowledge.
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2008: 357-370 |
| 80 | | Michael Backes,
Dominique Unruh:
Limits of Constructive Security Proofs.
ASIACRYPT 2008: 290-307 |
| 79 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Dominique Unruh:
OAEP Is Secure under Key-Dependent Messages.
ASIACRYPT 2008: 506-523 |
| 78 | | Michael Backes,
Stefan Lorenz,
Matteo Maffei,
Kim Pecina:
The CASPA Tool: Causality-Based Abstraction for Security Protocol Analysis.
CAV 2008: 419-422 |
| 77 | | Michael Backes,
Catalin Hritcu,
Matteo Maffei:
Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-Calculus.
CSF 2008: 195-209 |
| 76 | | Michael Backes,
Dominique Unruh:
Computational Soundness of Symbolic Zero-Knowledge Proofs Against Active Attackers.
CSF 2008: 255-269 |
| 75 | | Michael Backes,
Boris Köpf:
Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks.
ESORICS 2008: 517-532 |
| 74 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Dominique Unruh:
Compromising Reflections-or-How to Read LCD Monitors around the Corner.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2008: 158-169 |
| 73 | | Michael Backes,
Matteo Maffei,
Dominique Unruh:
Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2008: 202-215 |
| 72 | | Michael Backes,
Matthias Berg,
Dominique Unruh:
A Formal Language for Cryptographic Pseudocode.
LPAR 2008: 353-376 |
| 71 | | Michael Backes,
Marek Hamerlik,
Alessandro Linari,
Matteo Maffei,
Christos Tryfonopoulos,
Gerhard Weikum:
Anonymous and censorship resistant content sharing in unstructured overlays.
PODC 2008: 429 |
| 70 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Limits of the BRSIM/UC soundness of Dolev-Yao-style XOR.
Int. J. Inf. Sec. 7(1): 33-54 (2008) |
| 69 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Dennis Hofheinz,
Ralf Küsters:
Conditional reactive simulatability.
Int. J. Inf. Sec. 7(2): 155-169 (2008) |
| 68 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Andre Scedrov:
Key-dependent message security under active attacks - BRSIM/UC-soundness of Dolev-Yao-style encryption with key cycles.
Journal of Computer Security 16(5): 497-530 (2008) |
| 2007 |
|---|
| 67 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Andre Scedrov:
Key-dependent Message Security under Active Attacks - BRSIM/UC-Soundness of Symbolic Encryption with Key Cycles.
CSF 2007: 112-124 |
| 66 | | Michael Backes,
Agostino Cortesi,
Matteo Maffei:
Causality-based Abstraction of Multiplicity in Security Protocols.
CSF 2007: 355-369 |
| 65 | | Michael Backes,
Agostino Cortesi,
Riccardo Focardi,
Matteo Maffei:
A calculus of challenges and responses.
FMSE 2007: 51-60 |
| 64 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Ralf Küsters:
On Simulatability Soundness and Mapping Soundness of Symbolic Cryptography.
FSTTCS 2007: 108-120 |
| 63 | | Michael Backes,
Matteo Maffei,
Dominique Unruh:
Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol.
Formal Protocol Verification Applied 2007 |
| 62 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Dominique Unruh:
Information Flow in the Peer-Reviewing Process.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2007: 187-191 |
| 61 | | Michael Backes,
Jörn Müller-Quade,
Dominique Unruh:
On the Necessity of Rewinding in Secure Multiparty Computation.
TCC 2007: 157-173 |
| 60 | | Michael Backes,
Andre Scedrov:
Preface.
Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 180(1): 1-2 (2007) |
| 59 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
The reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for asynchronous systems.
Inf. Comput. 205(12): 1685-1720 (2007) |
| 58 | | Michael Backes,
Stefanos Gritzalis,
Bart Preneel:
Preface.
Int. J. Inf. Sec. 6(6): 359-360 (2007) |
| 57 | | Michael Backes,
David A. Basin,
Michael Waidner:
Preface.
Journal of Computer Security 15(6): 561 (2007) |
| 2006 |
|---|
| 56 |  | Sokratis K. Katsikas,
Javier Lopez,
Michael Backes,
Stefanos Gritzalis,
Bart Preneel:
Information Security, 9th International Conference, ISC 2006, Samos Island, Greece, August 30 - September 2, 2006, Proceedings
Springer 2006 |
| 55 | | Michael Backes,
Peeter Laud:
Computationally sound secrecy proofs by mechanized flow analysis.
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2006: 370-379 |
| 54 | | Christoph Sprenger,
Michael Backes,
David A. Basin,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving.
CSFW 2006: 153-166 |
| 53 | | Michael Backes,
Christian Cachin,
Alina Oprea:
Secure Key-Updating for Lazy Revocation.
ESORICS 2006: 327-346 |
| 52 | | Michael Backes,
Iliano Cervesato,
Aaron D. Jaggard,
Andre Scedrov,
Joe-Kai Tsay:
Cryptographically Sound Security Proofs for Basic and Public-Key Kerberos.
ESORICS 2006: 362-383 |
| 51 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Limits of the BRSIM/UC Soundness of Dolev-Yao Models with Hashes.
ESORICS 2006: 404-423 |
| 50 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Dennis Hofheinz,
Ralf Küsters:
Conditional Reactive Simulatability.
ESORICS 2006: 424-443 |
| 49 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Formal Methods and Cryptography.
FM 2006: 612-616 |
| 48 | | Michael Backes,
Sebastian Mödersheim,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Luca Viganò:
Symbolic and Cryptographic Analysis of the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging Scenario.
FoSSaCS 2006: 428-445 |
| 47 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
On the Cryptographic Key Secrecy of the Strengthened Yahalom Protocol.
SEC 2006: 233-245 |
| 46 | | Michael Backes:
Real-or-random Key Secrecy of the Otway-Rees Protocol via a Symbolic Security Proof.
Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 155: 111-145 (2006) |
| 45 | | Michael Backes,
Anupam Datta,
Ante Derek,
John C. Mitchell,
Mathieu Turuani:
Compositional analysis of contract-signing protocols.
Theor. Comput. Sci. 367(1-2): 33-56 (2006) |
| 2005 |
|---|
| 44 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth:
A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of an Electronic Payment System.
CSFW 2005: 78-93 |
| 43 | | Michael Backes,
Anupam Datta,
Ante Derek,
John C. Mitchell,
Mathieu Turuani:
Compositional Analysis of Contract Signing Protocols.
CSFW 2005: 94-110 |
| 42 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Limits of the Cryptographic Realization of Dolev-Yao-Style XOR.
ESORICS 2005: 178-196 |
| 41 | | Michael Backes:
Quantifying Probabilistic Information Flow in Computational Reactive Systems.
ESORICS 2005: 336-354 |
| 40 | | Michael Backes,
Dennis Hofheinz,
Jörn Müller-Quade,
Dominique Unruh:
On fairness in simulatability-based cryptographic systems.
FMSE 2005: 13-22 |
| 39 | | Michael Backes,
Christian Cachin,
Alina Oprea:
Lazy Revocation in Cryptographic File Systems.
IEEE Security in Storage Workshop 2005: 1-11 |
| 38 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2005: 171-182 |
| 37 | | Michael Backes,
Thomas Groß:
Tailoring the Dolev-Yao abstraction to web services realities.
SWS 2005: 65-74 |
| 36 | | Michael Backes,
Christian Cachin:
Public-Key Steganography with Active Attacks.
TCC 2005: 210-226 |
| 35 | | Michael Backes,
Jan Camenisch,
Dieter Sommer:
Anonymous yet accountable access control.
WPES 2005: 40-46 |
| 34 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy.
IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput. 2(2): 109-123 (2005) |
| 33 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Symmetric authentication in a simulatable Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library.
Int. J. Inf. Sec. 4(3): 135-154 (2005) |
| 32 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Reactively secure signature schemes.
Int. J. Inf. Sec. 4(4): 242-252 (2005) |
| 31 | | Michael Backes:
Unifying simulatability definitions in cryptographic systems under different timing assumptions.
J. Log. Algebr. Program. 64(2): 157-188 (2005) |
| 2004 |
|---|
| 30 | | Vijayalakshmi Atluri,
Michael Backes,
David A. Basin,
Michael Waidner:
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering, FMSE 2004, Washingtion, DC, USA, October 29, 2004
ACM 2004 |
| 29 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library.
CSFW 2004: 204-218 |
| 28 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Rainer Steinwandt:
An Algebra for Composing Enterprise Privacy Policies.
ESORICS 2004: 33-52 |
| 27 | | Michael Backes:
A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of the Otway-Rees Protocol.
ESORICS 2004: 89-108 |
| 26 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Justifying a Dolev-Yao Model Under Active Attacks.
FOSAD 2004: 1-41 |
| 25 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Low-Level Ideal Signatures and General Integrity Idealization.
ISC 2004: 39-51 |
| 24 | | Michael Backes,
Dennis Hofheinz:
How to Break and Repair a Universally Composable Signature Functionality.
ISC 2004: 61-72 |
| 23 | | Michael Backes,
Markus Dürmuth,
Günter Karjoth:
Unification in Privacy Policy Evaluation - Translating EPAL into Prolog.
POLICY 2004: 185-188 |
| 22 | | Michael Backes,
Günter Karjoth,
Walid Bagga,
Matthias Schunter:
Efficient comparison of enterprise privacy policies.
SAC 2004: 375-382 |
| 21 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
A General Composition Theorem for Secure Reactive Systems.
TCC 2004: 336-354 |
| 20 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 22(10): 2075-2086 (2004) |
| 19 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Computational probabilistic noninterference.
Int. J. Inf. Sec. 3(1): 42-60 (2004) |
| 18 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Polynomial liveness.
Journal of Computer Security 12(3-4): 589-617 (2004) |
| 2003 |
|---|
| 17 | | Michael Backes,
David A. Basin:
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering, FMSE 2003, Washington, DC, USA, October 30, 2003
ACM 2003 |
| 16 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations.
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2003: 220-230 |
| 15 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Security in Business Process Engineering.
Business Process Management 2003: 168-183 |
| 14 | | Michael Backes:
Unifying Simulatability Definitions in Cryptographic Systems under Different Timing Assumptions.
CONCUR 2003: 346-360 |
| 13 | | Michael Backes,
Christian Cachin:
Reliable Broadcast in a Computational Hybrid Model with Byzantine Faults, Crashes, and Recoveries.
DSN 2003: 37-46 |
| 12 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Matthias Schunter:
A Toolkit for Managing Enterprise Privacy Policies.
ESORICS 2003: 162-180 |
| 11 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Symmetric Authentication within a Simulatable Cryptographic Library.
ESORICS 2003: 271-290 |
| 10 | | Michael Backes,
Catherine Meadows,
John C. Mitchell:
Relating cryptography and formal methods: a panel.
FMSE 2003: 61-66 |
| 9 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
A Cryptographically Sound Security Proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key Protocol.
FSTTCS 2003: 1-12 |
| 8 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Intransitive Non-Interference for Cryptographic Purpose.
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2003: 140- |
| 7 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Waidner:
Reactively Secure Signature Schemes.
ISC 2003: 84-95 |
| 6 | | Michael Backes,
Matthias Schunter:
From absence of certain vulnerabilities towards security proofs: pushing the limits of formal verification.
NSPW 2003: 67-74 |
| 5 | | Michael Backes,
Christian Cachin,
Reto Strobl:
Proactive secure message transmission in asynchronous networks.
PODC 2003: 223-232 |
| 4 | | Michael Backes,
Christian Jacobi:
Cryptographically Sound and Machine-Assisted Verification of Security Protocols.
STACS 2003: 675-686 |
| 2002 |
|---|
| 3 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann,
Michael Steiner,
Michael Waidner:
Polynomial Fairness and Liveness.
CSFW 2002: 160-174 |
| 2 | | Michael Backes,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Computational Probabilistic Non-interference.
ESORICS 2002: 1-23 |
| 1 | | Michael Backes,
Christian Jacobi,
Birgit Pfitzmann:
Deriving Cryptographically Sound Implementations Using Composition and Formally Verified Bisimulation.
FME 2002: 310-329 |
