5. ACM-EC 2004: New York, NY, USA

@proceedings{DBLP:conf/sigecom/2004,
  editor    = {Jack S. Breese and
               Joan Feigenbaum and
               Margo I. Seltzer},
  title     = {Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004),
               New York, NY, USA, May 17-20, 2004},
  booktitle = {ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce},
  publisher = {ACM},
  year      = {2004},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de}
}

Session 1

• Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Pierfrancesco La Mura:
  Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets. 1-8
  
• Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Elan Pavlov:
  Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market. 9-20
  
• Alessandro Acquisti:
  Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of immediate gratification. 21-29
  

Session 2

• Joshua T. Goodman, Robert Rounthwaite:
  Stopping outgoing spam. 30-39
  
• Thede Loder, Marshall W. van Alstyne, Rick Wash:
  An economic answer to unsolicited communication. 40-50
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. 51-60
  

Session 3

• Ryan Porter:
  Mechanism design for online real-time scheduling. 61-70
  
• Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes:
  Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. 71-80
  
• Satinder P. Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman:
  Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria in tree-games of incomplete information. 81-90
  

Session 4

• Sergio Marti, Hector Garcia-Molina:
  Limited reputation sharing in P2P systems. 91-101
  
• Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, John Chuang:
  Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. 102-111
  
• Baruch Awerbuch, Boaz Patt-Shamir, David Peleg, Mark R. Tuttle:
  Collaboration of untrusting peers with changing interests. 112-119
  

Session 5

• Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
  Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions. 120-124
  
• Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, Amin Saberi:
  On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. 125-131
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. 132-141
  

Session 6

• WooYoung Kim, Alan H. Karp:
  Customizable description and dynamic discovery for web services. 142-151
  
• Michael Benisch, Amy R. Greenwald, Victor Naroditskiy, Michael Carl Tschantz:
  A stochastic programming approach to scheduling in TAC SCM. 152-159
  
• Darko Kirovski:
  Toward an automated verification of certificates of authenticity. 160-169
  

Session 7

• David M. Pennock:
  A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation. 170-179
  
• Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
  Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. 180-188
  
• Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, Yishay Mansour, Luis E. Ortiz:
  Competitive algorithms for VWAP and limit order trading. 189-198
  
• Udi Manber:
  Customer-centric innovations for search and e-commerce. 199
  
• Sarah Spiekermann:
  Product context in EC websites: how consumer uncertainty and purchase risk drive navigational needs. 200-207
  
• Pearl Huan Z. Pu, Pratyush Kumar:
  Evaluating example-based search tools. 208-217
  
• Qing Wang, Dwight J. Makaroff, H. Keith Edwards:
  Characterizing customer groups for an e-commerce website. 218-227
  

Brief announcements

• Alan H. Karp, Ren Wu, Kay-Yut Chen, Alex Zhang:
  A game tree strategy for automated negotiation. 228-229
  
• Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Transitive voting. 230-231
  
• Ana Cristina Bicharra Garcia, Martin Ekstrom, Hans Bjornsson:
  HYRIWYG: leveraging personalization to elicit honest recommendations. 232-233
  
• Kay-Yut Chen, Tad Hogg, Nathan Wozny:
  Experimental study of market reputation mechanisms. 234-235
  
• Tad Hogg, Lada A. Adamic:
  Enhancing reputation mechanisms via online social networks. 236-237
  
• Meir Bing, Daniel J. Lehmann, Paul Milgrom:
  Presentation and structure of substitutes valuations. 238-239
  
• Marc A. Smith, Duncan Davenport, Howard Hwa, Tammara Combs Turner:
  Object auras: a mobile retail and product annotation system. 240-241
  
• Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer:
  Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games. 242-243
  
• Shuchi Chawla, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi, Amitabh Sinha:
  Worst-case payoffs of a location game. 244-245
  
• Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Behavorial mechanism design as an online marketing tool. 246-247
  
• Yacov Yacobi:
  On the economics of anti-counterfeiting. 248-249
  
• Debasis Mishra:
  Simple primal-dual auctions are not possible. 250-251
  
• Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen:
  On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation: [extended abstract]. 252-253
  
• Chuck Lam:
  SNACK: incorporating social network information in automated collaborative filtering. 254-255
  
• Sheng Zhang, Song Ye, Fillia Makedon, James Ford:
  A hybrid negotiation strategy mechanism in an automated negotiation system. 256-257
  
• Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham:
  Designing efficient online trading systems. 258-259
  
• Michael P. O'Mahony, Neil J. Hurley, Guenole C. M. Silvestre:
  Utility-based neighbourhood formation for efficient and robust collaborative filtering. 260-261
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. 262-263
  
• Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result. 264-265
  
• Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. 266-267
  
• Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
  Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions. 268-269